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1. Introduction  
 
One of the main social costs of the crisis has been for poverty 
and social exclusion to spread notably across Europe. Eurostat figures 
show that, in 2015 in the 28 European Member States, 118.8 million 
people (23.7 per cent of the population) were at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion. While the “new comers” to European integration 
(Poland, Romania and Bulgaria) have seen a reduction in the rate of 
poverty, others have experienced increasing levels of poverty (Italy, 
Spain, Greece, the Netherlands and UK). 
This creates a challenge for constitutional legal systems in 
Europe, especially those where human dignity and social rights are 
included in constitutional provisions. Extreme poverty is a condition 
that impinges on the very heart of human dignity not only because it is 
an obstacle to achieving the basic goods a human needs to exist, but 
also because impacts on a person’s ability to maintain interpersonal 
relationships and a minimal degree of participation in social, cultural 
and political life.  
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Taking this scenario as the basis, the aim of this paper is to offer 
food for thought on the sensitive relationship among human dignity, 
economic inequality and poverty from a constitutional perspective. 
The paper is divided in two parts: the first one addresses the issue 
starting from a theoretical perspective in order to provide a more 
concrete understanding of the equality/inequality, human dignity and 
poverty triad, and the consequent implications. The second part 
adopts a more analytical perspective, focusing on one of the tools 
designed by legal systems to fight poverty and restore equality and 
human dignity: the Minimum Income (MI).  
 
 
2. Equality and human dignity: a breakable hedge against 
economic inequality?  
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) opens by 
asserting that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights.” The Declaration is considered a turning point in the relation 
between the individual and society, between liberty and authority.1 In 
such a perspective, the reference to human dignity in the preamble – 
along with the articles of the Universal Declaration – has come to be 
seen as a Copernican revolution for international law2 and human 
rights discourse.  
The recognition of human dignity is a foundation block for the 
set of universally-declared rights in the UDHR. Borrowing the well-
known image conceived by René Cassin3, the UDHR can be compared 
to a Greek temple: “The seven clauses of the Preamble are the steps 
leading up to the entrance. The basic principles of dignity, liberty, 
equality, and brotherhood, proclaimed in the first two articles, are the 
                                                                                            
1 J. Hoover, Rereading the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: plurality 
and contestation, not consensus, in Journal of Human Rights, 2013, p. 217 ss.  
2 Human dignity is the common thread of the whole declaration, from the 
Preamble to several articles (see articles 1, 22, 23).  
3 M. Agi and R. Cassin, Fantassin des droits de l’homme, Paris, 1979, p. 317.  
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foundation blocks for four columns of rights: rights pertaining to 
individuals as such; rights of individuals in relation to each other and 
to various groups; spiritual, public and political rights; and, finally, 
economic, social and cultural rights. Crowning the portico is a 
pediment consisting of three concluding articles that place rights in 
the context of limits, duties, and the social and political order in 
which they are to be realized.”4 The Declaration was intended to be 
an ideal way to codify a lowest common denominator for human 
rights, capable of ensuring – wherever respected and implemented – 
decent living conditions for humanity as a whole and, as a 
consequence, lasting peace achieved not only because of the 
recognition of individual liberties but also because of the obligations 
and duties designed to protect social rights.5  
The strong connection between equality and human dignity has 
subsequently been reflected in several Constitutions.6 For example, 
such a connection is evident in Italian Constitution, where a peculiar 
shade of dignity is offered. Art. 3.1 states that “All citizens have equal 
social dignity and are equal before the law.” This recognition – 
especially the phrase “equal social dignity” – leads to content that has 
plenty of substantive implications. It becomes explanatory, corrective 
                                                                                            
4 The image is repeatedly recalled by M.A. Glendon in several papers. See, 
among the others, M.A. Glendon, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, in Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, 2004, p. 3.  
5 Eleonore Roosevelt, speaking on behalf of the US delegation, affirmed: 
“The United States delegation favoured the inclusion of economic and social rights 
in the Declaration, for no personal liberty could exist without economic security and 
independence. Men in need were not free men” (quoted in Summary Record of the 
Sixty-Fourth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 3rd Sess., 64th mtg., 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.64 (1948). See, among the latest publications, C. Breen, 
Economic and Social Rights and the Maintenance of International Peace and 
Security, London, 2017; A. Cahill-Ripley, Reclaiming the Peacebuilding Agenda: 
Economic and Social Rights as a Legal Framework for Building Positive Peace - A 
Human Security Plus Approach to Peacebuilding, in Human Rights Law Review, 
2016, p. 223 ss.  
6 For examples, see the Constitution of Germany, the Constitution of India 
and the Constitution of South Africa. 
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and innovative compared to the traditional formulation of the 
principle of equality in its purely liberal matrix;7 in the subsection on 
the formal dimension of equality, it introduces a new dimension that 
places the individual in its social dimension – not some abstract 
individual – at the heart of public action, seeing the individual as part 
of the net of relationships with society, the state and the other 
members of the community. The reference to “equal social dignity” 
creates a bridge between formal equality and the substantive equality 
expressed in art. 3.2, which is seen as the cornerstone of the social 
state in the Italian legal system because the disposition charges the 
state with “the duty to remove those obstacles of an economic or 
social nature which constrain the freedom and equality of citizens, 
thereby impeding the full development of the human person and the 
effective participation of all workers in the political, economic and 
social organization of the country.” 
Despite human dignity and equality being recognized by 
international documents and Constitutions, there remains a constant 
tension on this front as such recognition has been insufficient to 
ensure their concrete implementation and to prevent the 
mushrooming of economic inequality. Globalization and the 
economic crisis that spread from the US and the EU to the rest of the 
world have been fundamental in driving the debate about economic 
inequalities8, expressed in a demand for dignity9, drawing in many 
                                                                                            
7 G. Ferrara, La pari dignità sociale. Appunti per una ricostruzione, in Studi 
in onore di Giuseppe Chiarelli, Milano, 1974, p. 1089 ss.; see also, ex multis, P.F. 
Grossi, La dignità nella Costituzione italiana, in E. Ceccherini (ed.), La tutela della 
dignità dell’uomo, Napoli, 2008, p. 97 ss.  
8 On the direction of causality between economic crisis and inequality and 
the reverse direction between inequality and economic crisis see A.B. Atkinson and 
S. Morelli, Economic crises and Inequality, Human Development Research Paper, 
2011. 
9 D. Moellendorf, Inequality and the Inherent Dignity of Persons, in Global 
Inequality Matters. Global Ethics Series, London, 2009, p. 1 ss.  
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scholars from a range of disciplines.10 Stiglitz argues that: “Inequality 
has become the issue of the day. (…) That there will be social, 
political, and economic consequences goes without saying.”11 Indeed, 
many scholars see economic inequality as the leading cause of rising 
populisms.12 
This debate has inevitably lured another theme, that of poverty. 
Economic inequalities and poverty are considered, first of all, to be an 
infringement of dignity.13 Secondly, despite a lack of consensus on this 
issue among economists14, several authors15 and the International 
                                                                                            
10 It is not a little odd that equality and inequality stand at the crossroads of 
several disciplines, as recommended by Hirschman (A.O. Hirschman, Essay in 
Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond, Cambridge, 1981); see also, on the 
appropriate relationship between law and economics, G. Calabresi, The Future of 
Law and Economics: Essays in Reform and Recollection, New Haven, Connecticut, 
2016. 
11 J. Stiglitz, Wealth and Income Inequality in the Twenty-First Century, in 
https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu, 2017. 
12 N. O’Connor, Three Connections between Rising Economic Inequality and 
the Rise of Populism, in Irish Studies in International Affairs, vol. 28, 2017, p. 29 ss. 
According to Inglehart and Norris, we can count two main theories explaining the 
populistic phenomenon: the economic inequality perspective and the cultural 
backlash thesis. The Authors argue that “looking more directly at evidence for the 
economic insecurity thesis, the results of the empirical analysis are mixed and 
inconsistent” (R.F. Inglehart and P. Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of 
Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash, Harvard Kennedy School 
Research Working Paper Series, 2016). Mudde takes a critical view of the theories 
according to which economic inequality is the only or the leading cause of populism 
(C. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge, 2009).  
13 See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the World 
Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993.  
14 For example, according to Okun, equality policies would prompt a loss of 
economic efficiency (A.M. Okun, Equality and Efficiency: the Big Trade-Off, 
Washington, 1975). See also E.P. Lazear and S. Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as 
Optimum Labor Contracts, in Journal of Political Economy, vol. 89(5), 1981, p. 841 
ss.; R.J. Barro, Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries, in Journal of 
Economic Growth, vol. 5(1), 2010, p. 5 ss.  
15 A. Berg and J.D. Ostry, Inequality and Unsustainable Growth: Two Sides 
of the Same Coin?, in IMF Staff Discussion Note, Washington, 2011.  
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Monetary Fund (IMF) argue poverty and inequality are strictly 
intertwined in a negative relation. They affect each other directly and 
indirectly through their impact on economic growth.16 The growing 
gap between the richest and poorest is directly linked to higher rates 
of poverty, as measured using the Gini coefficient – the widely used 
index of income inequality. Thus, we can draw a trilateral figure 
linking poverty, economic inequality and human dignity. 
 
 
3. The equality/inequality, human dignity and poverty triad  
 
The equality/inequality, human dignity and poverty triad is 
complex to define and fully understand as it is problematic to 
precisely define these three components. At first glance, the concept 
of poverty might seem the easiest to define – far simpler than the 
concepts of equality or human dignity – as it at least expresses a 
certain degree of measurability, but in practice it becomes quite 
tricky, especially to understand in-depth. This section aims to 
highlight the ambiguity of these concepts and how they are open to 
different understandings, both individually and in relation to each 
other.  
 
 
3.1. Equality and inequality  
 
In his paper “What is inequality?”, Dworkin prefaced his 
reflections with the following sentence: “Equality is a popular but 
mysterious political ideal”.17 This assumption underpins the same 
concern which Sen has highlighted asking the essential question 
“equality of what?” The difficulties in answering those questions 
                                                                                            
16 Ex multis, see F. Naschold, Why inequality matters for poverty, in 
Inequality Briefing, London, 2002.  
17 R. Dworkin, What is inequality?, in Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 10, n. 
3, 1981, pp. 185. 
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derive partly from the fact equality is itself a paradox, not so much 
because – remembering Peter Westen’s words – we profess to believe 
in equality, yet we allow inequality to abound,18 but rather because 
there is no doubt all people are different and, in order to treat them 
equally, it becomes necessary to offer different treatments, such that 
some members of the collective receive these and others do not. 
Furthermore, substantive equality requires active policies through 
which the state provides services or/and secures the equal provision of 
certain specific goods. And this proactive role carries costs borne by 
the state and, consequently, by the community.19  
The concept of equality, considered both broadly and 
economically (as economic equality or economic inequality), cannot 
be considered a purely descriptive concept: “One’s attitude toward 
economic inequality and the measures that one believes a democratic 
government should take to reduce it depends on one’s belief about 
the type of society one is living in.”20 
Every society is inspired by specific ideas of justice and social 
justice that establish how the society must be built, the role of liberty 
in its relationship with authority, and the an and the quomodo by 
which public authorities regulate society and the market. In a nutshell, 
a pivotal knot is the role attributed to liberty and equality in a 
constitutional system and the effective balance between them.21 And 
                                                                                            
18 P. Westen, The concept of equal opportunity, in Ethics, vol. 95, n. 4, 1985, 
p. 837: “We profess to believe in equal opportunity, yet we allow unequal 
opportunity to abound.” 
19 S. Holmes, C.R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: why liberty depends on taxes, 
New York-London, 1999; among Italian Constitutional scholars see M. Luciani, 
Diritti sociali e livelli delle prestazioni pubbliche nei sessant’anni della Corte 
costituzionale, in Rivista italiana dei costituzionalisti, 2016.  
20 F. Fukuyama, Dealing with Inequality, in F. Fukuyama, L. Diamond and 
M.F. Plattner (eds.), Poverty, Inequality, and Democracy, Baltimore, 2012, p. 3 ss. 
21 R.E. Howard and J. Donnelly, Human dignity, human rights and political 
regimes, in American Political Science Review, vol. 80(3), 1986, p. 806: “many 
avowed liberals view liberty and equality as largely antagonistic principles to be 
traded off against one another, rather than as complementary dimensions of the 
single principle of equal concern and respect”.  
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all of these key elements affect the distinction between good and bad 
inequalities.  
This is not the place to exhaustively investigate the multiple 
theoretical approaches to equality and economic inequality. Although 
we are restricting our reflections on economic inequality, it is worth 
remembering there is a broad spectrum of economic theories. For 
example, some scholars argue economic equality is not something bad 
itself, but a free society unavoidably requires or entails a degree of 
economic inequality.22 In a sense, economic inequalities might be a 
symptom of economic health.23 Some scholars, even within a liberal 
approach, view economic inequality as a ‘pathology’ that needs to be 
treated through weakened redistribution schemes.24 For others, closer 
to the socialist approach, economic inequality is regarded as a source 
                                                                                            
22 See, among others, F. Von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago, 
1960; M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, 1962 and M. Friedman, Free 
to Choose: A Personal Statement, San Diego, 1980. See also, N.G. Mankiw, 
Defending the One Percent, in Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 27, 2013, p. 
21 ss.; E. Conard, The Upside of Inequality: How Good Intentions Undermine the 
Middle Class, New York, 2016. 
23 S. Kuznet, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, in The American 
Economic Review, vol. 45(1), 1955, p. 1 ss. and the Kuznet curve theory, criticised – 
among others – by Stiglitz according to whom, “Those prevailing doctrines were 
upset by what happened after 1980, as inequality in virtually every dimension 
increased in the US and many other countries” (J. Stiglitz, Wealth and Income 
Inequality in the Twenty-First Century, in https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu, 2013, 
last accessed 12 February 2019). 
24 A. Sen, On Economic Inequality, Oxford, 1973; T. Piketty, Capital in the 
21st Century, Cambridge, 2014 (who defines himself as a liberal). See also R. 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Massachusetts, 1977, p. 273: “Government must 
not only treat people with concern and respect but with equal concern and respect. 
It must not distribute goods or opportunities unequally on the ground that some 
citizens are entitled to more because they are worthy of more concern. It must not 
constrain liberty on the ground that one citizen’s conception of the good life (…) is 
nobler or superior to another’s”. 
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of growing poverty rates and as a cause of a slowdown in economic 
growth, thus a cost for society as a whole.25 
Consequently, this wide spectrum shifts with ways of thinking 
and approaching the doctrine of laissez-faire laissez-passer26, which 
leads back to the heart of constitutionalism, to the eternal nexus 
between freedom and authority - the “abstentionist”/“interventionist” 
state dichotomy.27 The concrete nuances which suit economic theory 
and their constitutional premises are the result of a specific 
constitutional context.28  
This non-neutrality of equality within economics has resulted in 
a macro-distinction between a twofold ideal: equality/inequality of 
opportunities and equality/inequality of outcomes. As Flew assumed, 
an “ideal of equality of opportunity (…) is distinguished by wanting 
only that people be provided with equal or equivalent opportunities, 
leaving it up to the individual whether or not the opportunities are in 
fact taken; whereas the egalitarian of outcome, as his label indicates, 
strives to equalize, in whatever dimensions are under discussion, 
eventual conditions.”29  
Equality of opportunity is largely considered the basic standard 
for equality, able to justify social and economic inequalities. 
According to Rawls’s second principle, “social and economic 
                                                                                            
25 J. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society 
Endangers Our Future, New York, 2012. 
26 Only mentioning a few of them: firstly, the minimal state by Nozick. Then, 
we can mention the pure version of liberalism, neoliberalism, ordoliberalism and the 
Soziale Marktwirtschaft from the Freiburg School. And finally, egalitarianism, 
socialism and communism need to be considered. 
27 G. Bognetti, Dividing Powers. A Theory of The Separation of Powers, 
Padova, 2017 
28 According to Sitaraman, “Any attempt to address economic power in 
constitutional theory will run headfirst into a series of pervasive, persistent, and even 
perverse problems” (G. Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in 
Constitutional Theory, in Cornell Law Review, vol. 101, 2016, p. 1445 ss.). 
29 A. Flew, The Politics of Procrustes. Contradictions of enforced equality, 
London, 1981, p. 47. See also P. Von Parijs, Qu’est-ce qu’une societé juste?, Paris, 
1991. 
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inequalities are justified only if (a) they are attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, 
and (b) they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, 
meaning that some lesser degree of inequality would make the least 
advantaged even worse off.”30 
However, the distinction between equality of opportunities and 
equality of outcomes, and the set minimum threshold are not decisive. 
Equality of opportunity is usually described as the possibility of all 
individuals to take part in open competition where “the only 
opportunity which is equal is precisely the opportunity to compete on 
these terms.”31 Such a definition could appear pleonastic; moreover, a 
narrow narrative runs the risk of, on the one hand, connecting the 
equality of opportunities to a liberal approach and, on the other end, 
deriving the equality of outcomes from socialism/collectivism. 
However, such a distinction is unable to capture the variety of 
nuances that characterize the theoretical approaches to equality of 
opportunities. These entail a structural ambiguity that is liable to be 
seen as a justification for distributive policies or non-distributive 
policies or, at the same time, distributive policies designed to 
reconcile individualism and collectivism.32 What does equality of 
opportunity mean? What are these opportunities?  
Consequently, once again, one gets the feeling this street is a 
dead end. And this feeling is fuelled by the preliminary realization we 
need to understand what economic inequality really means. Does it 
mean income inequality or does it require a more comprehensive 
definition that includes the different positions of general economic 
distribution (pay, wealth, income)? 
 
 
3.2. From poverty to human dignity  
                                                                                            
30 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, 1971, p. 302 
31 A. Flew, op.cit., p. 45  
32 L. Einaudi, Concetto e limiti della uguaglianza nei punti di partenza, in L. 
Einaudi, Lezioni di politica sociale, Torino, 1964.  
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The same difficulties with defining equality/inequality arise 
when defining the next term in the triad, namely poverty. Although 
scholars vary greatly in their views on the positive or negative value of 
economic inequality, there is a widespread consensus on the need to 
fight poverty. Some scholars even argue the real problem is poverty 
and not economic inequality.33 
How can we define poverty? And how can we measure 
poverty?34 It has been stated “poverty is pain. Poor people suffer 
physical pain that comes with too little food and long hours of work; 
emotional pain stemming from the daily humiliations of dependency 
and lack of power; and the moral pain from being forced to make 
choices.”35 One of the traditional criteria for measuring poverty is to 
set an absolute or relative threshold, distinguishing between absolute 
and relative poverty.36 
The absolute poverty standard is defined “in terms of a level of 
purchasing power that is sufficient to buy a fixed bundle of basic 
necessities at a specific point in time”; the relative standard is 
commensurate to “the typical income or consumption level in the 
wider society.”37 Absolute poverty seems to entail a more static 
threshold whereas relative poverty a more dynamic one, with wider, 
                                                                                            
33 Quoting Early: “despite the fact that income inequality and poverty are 
often conflated, they are different” (J.F. Early, Reassessing the facts about 
inequality, poverty and redistribution, in Policy analysis, 2018, p. 1) and, according 
to Feldstein, “the difference is not just semantic” (M. Feldstein, Income inequality 
and poverty, NBER Working paper series, 1998). See also H.G. Frankfurt, On 
Inequality, Princeton, 2015; W. Watson, The Inequality Trap: Fighting Capitalism 
Instead of Poverty, Toronto, 2015.  
34 See T.M. Smeeding, Poverty measurement, in D. Brady and L.M. Burton 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Social Science of Poverty, Oxford, 2016, p. 21. 
35 D. Naryan and R. Patel and K. Schafft and A. Raemacher and S. 
Kochschltte, Voices of the Poor; Can Anyone hear Us?, New York, 2000, p. 6.  
36 See, among others, J.E. Foster, Absolute versus Relative Poverty, in The 
American Economic Review, vol. 88(2), 1998 p. 335 ss. 
37 T.M. Smeeding, Sociology of Poverty, LIS Working Paper Series, no. 315, 
Luxembourg Income Study, 2002, p. 5. 
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more fluky parameters. Ultimately, as assumed by Blank, “poverty is 
an inherently vague concept and developing a poverty measure 
involves a number of relatively arbitrary assumptions.”38 
Criteria designed to set poverty lines are ultimately arbitrary 
because, firstly, the multidimensionality of poverty39 and, secondly, 
the lack of a common understanding of what a minimum consists of.40 
In other words, there is a lack of consensus on what basic goods are 
necessary to guarantee human existence and an adequate standard of 
living. The statement that basic goods are those goods that are 
essential to fulfil daily basic needs appears to be little more than a 
tautology. The UDHR itself makes the effort to pinpoint some of the 
basic goods necessary to achieve a suitable standard of living, 
including “food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary 
social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old-age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control” (art. 22).  
However, creating a common definition for basic goods or 
defining a common catalogue is a complex issue. The expression 
“essential goods”/“basic goods” tends to be filled with a variety of 
senses, embracing many factors, from a notion of human dignity to 
                                                                                            
38 R. Blank, How to improve poverty measurement in the United States, in 
Journal of Public Analysis and Management, vol. 27(2), 2008, p. 243.  
39 It is worth remembering that the First Goal of the 2030 Agenda for 
sustainable development seeks to reduce multidimensional poverty (Goal 1: End 
poverty in all its forms everywhere and Goal 1.2: By 2030, reduce at least by half the 
proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its 
dimensions according to national definitions). On multidimensional poverty see F. 
Bourguignon and S. Chakravarty, The measurement of multidimensional poverty, in 
Journal of Economic Inequality, vol. 1(1), 2003, p. 25 ss.; F.H.G. Ferreira, Poverty 
is multidimensional. But what are we going to do about it?, in Journal of Economic 
Inequality, vol. 9(3), 2011, p. 493 ss. 
40 See A.B. Atkinson, On the Measurement of Poverty, in Econometrica, vol. 
55(4), 1987, p. 749 ss.; A. Coudouel and J.S. Hentschel and Q.T. Wodon, Poverty 
Measurement and Analysis in J. Klugman (ed.), A Sourcebook for poverty reduction 
strategies, Washington, 2002, p. 27 ss.  
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cultural, historical, religious and traditional ones.41 Many legal scholars 
and economists have sought to list basic goods, with most linking the 
identification of basic goods to the need to protect and implement human 
dignity. Such an assumption is probably insufficient to resolve this situation.  
Human dignity, as asserted by McCrudden, cannot be defined as an 
abstract principle.42 The consequences resulting from the application of this 
principle are very concrete, so that human dignity – along with liberty – has 
become the couple on which modern constitutionalisms are based. 
Nonetheless, the concept has become increasingly fluid and ambiguous. As 
much as there is a robust agreement on the importance of human dignity, 
there is no agreement on what it entails43 and this is the reason why human 
dignity dodges any attempt to redraw its boundaries.44  
                                                                                            
41 The cultural factor poses similar problems to those of universalism or 
cultural relativism in human rights. Some scholars argue that the cultural argument 
is a trick to hinder the protection of human rights (A. Phillips, Multiculturalism, 
Universalism and the Claims of Democracy, United Nations Research Institute for 
Social Development, Geneva, 2001) and other authors remember that this risk 
occurs when the cultural argument is radicalized, and a radical universalism may 
considered dangerous (see J. Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human 
Rights, in Human Rights Quarterly, 1984, pp. 400-419; M. Freeman, Human Rights, 
Polity Press, Cambridge, 2011). In support of the potential for intertwining these 
two approaches in some form of compromise and mutual respect see D. O’Sullivan, 
The history of human rights across the regions: Universalism vs cultural relativism, 
in The International Journal of Human Rights, 2007, pp. 22-48.  
42 See P. Carozza, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights: A Reply, in The European Journal of International Law, vol. 19(5), 2008, p. 
931 ss.  
43 C. McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights, in The European Journal of International Law, 2008, p. 655 ss.  
44 We need only to think of the main twofold senses that human dignity 
historically acquired - at least until a few decades ago - and which have spread out 
across the US legal system and the European states (G. Bognetti, The Concept of 
Human Dignity in European and U.S. Constitutionalism, in G. Nolte (ed.), 
European and US Constitutionalism, Science and Technique of Democracy, 
Cambridge, 2005, p. 85 ss.): on the one hand, a subjective conception of human 
dignity, closely associated with the idea of dignity as autonomy and liberty; on the 
other hand, an objective conception under which human dignity has been long 
considered by European lawyers as an “objective value”, able to limit other 
fundamental rights.  
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Even if, despite its multiple meanings, we take a positive, 
substantive concept of human dignity that associates human dignity 
with social welfare rights or with the need for basic conditions of well-
being, the issues surrounding its concrete content cannot be 
disentangled. The evanescence of a univocal conception of dignity, 
together with the fluidity of its anthropological presupposition, can 
provide at least two divergent interpretations of basic goods: a 
minimalist approach and a maximalist approach. In accordance with 
the first approach, basic goods include only those goods aimed to 
preserve livelihood. In second approach, basic goods become those 
things by which individual can realize their potential in their specific 
social context. In addition to health, food, water, and a healthy 
environment, we could include – for example – culture or free 
internet access as basic goods, and so on and so forth. And if 
anchoring the definition of basic goods to human dignity seems to 
suggest the maximalist approach, this approach must deal with 
discretionary choices made by the legislator who ought to balance 
social rights/basic goods with financial resources.  
This phenomenon can be better and more fully understood 
when a good becomes the content of a human/fundamental right (or 
of a new fundamental right, which often stems from human dignity45), 
resulting in the public authorities having to ensure its implementation 
in order to avoid it being jeopardized. To do this, public authorities 
face the everlasting dilemma of economic sustainability, especially in 
times of crisis. Indeed, economic criteria are often used to tip the 
balance in favour of one good/right rather than another or to gauge 
the degree to which it is protected.  
 
 
                                                                                            
45 Especially when a new right, conceived as a liberty right, takes the form of 
a welfare right in its practical implementation. To take just one example, in Italy 
medically assisted IVF treatments have been included among minimum healthcare 
provisions, as free healthcare services.  
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4. “We sail within a vast sphere, ever drifting in uncertainty, 
driven from end to end”46  
 
As asserted by Marta Nussbaum, “anything worth measuring, in 
human quality of life, is difficult to measure”.47 This difficulty not only 
depends, from a practical perspective, on the existence of a perfect 
measurement tool but also on a theoretical un-unravelable knot. 
Searching for a universally endorsed definition of equality, human 
dignity and poverty (the theoretical basis of economic inequality) is 
like sailing without seeing the harbour, echoing Pascal. Our aim here 
is not to solve the economic inequality dilemma. Moving on from the 
suggestion by Prof. Hirschl and Rosevear (“To truly rescue 
socioeconomic rights a more realist approach is required”48), our 
paper seeks to approach a defined perspective of economic inequality, 
focusing on income and analysing how European legal systems are 
trying to deal with the income poverty challenge.  
One of the instruments that has been implemented in European 
states is the ‘minimum income’ (MI). The implementation of MI has 
been encouraged by the European institutions. In 2017, the European 
Parliament adopted a resolution on minimum-income policies. 
Indeed, the European Parliament called on all Member States to 
introduce adequate minimum-income schemes in order to achieve the 
goal adopted in 2010 by the EU and its Member State to reduce the 
number of persons at risk of poverty and social exclusion by 20 
million by 2020. This call was partly based on the assumption that 
“high unemployment, poverty and inequality remain key concerns in 
some Member States; (…) broad income inequalities are not only 
                                                                                            
46 B. Pascal, Pensées, 1670. 
47 M. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Social Justice, in International Studies 
Review, vol. 4(2), 2002, p. 135. 
48 R. Hirschl and E. Rosevear, Constitutional Law Meets Comparative Politics: 
Socio-Economic Rights and Political Realities, in T. Campbell and K.D. Ewing and 
A. Tomkins, (eds.), The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays, 
Oxford, 2011, p. 208. 
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detrimental to social cohesion, but they also hamper sustainable 
economic growth; (…) the impact of the crisis has been generally 
more acute among lower-income individuals, pushing income 
inequalities upwards within European societies.”  
MI, which operates as a safety net of last resort designed to 
alleviate the negative externalities of the market, is seen as a remedy to 
poverty and economic inequality because its purpose is to bring 
individuals out of poverty, providing them with an acceptable 
standard of living. 
This tool is controversial both in its theoretical premises and in 
its effectiveness. First of all, it is worth noting that it subverts the 
traditional understanding of “liberalism” and “socialism”. Although 
one of its “defenders” is Von Hayek in his “The Road to Serfdom”, a 
sharp criticism is offered by Polany in “The Great Transformation”, 
who sees minimum income as a tool fostered by paternalism and 
assistentialism. Secondly, focusing on its effectiveness, this might 
depend on the specific features defined by each state. In this context, 
how is this tool designed in the different Member states and, 
especially, the Italian legal system? Can minimum income be an 
effective response to poverty and income inequality? 
 
 
5. Minimum Income in Europe: setting the scene  
 
Minimum-income schemes are becoming a very common tool 
for fighting poverty across Europe. The popularity of the instrument 
lies at the crossroads between the different national welfare systems 
and the influence of the European Union, which has fostered the 
adoption of certain measures to combat poverty in Member States. 
From a comparative perspective, minimum income is an interesting 
case study dealing with the tension between the specificity of each 
Member State in framing its system of welfare protection for those 
living under certain dignified standards, and the EU’s harmonization 
towards a common standard of (minimum) social rights protection.  
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As one can see this debate touches one of the most sensitive 
issues of the EU integration process: social rights protection, which is 
mainly a matter of national sovereignty, resisting the various attempts 
by the EU to influence and regulate this policy area. The debate about 
introducing MI schemes has gained force in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis, which challenged the traditional social security tools 
in many countries affected by the crisis and, in particular, by the 
austerity measures imposed by the EU and other international 
financial institutions. 
Prior to analysing MI schemes and their concrete 
implementation as part of an assessment of whether and under what 
conditions such a tool is effective in advancing human dignity in 
Europe, it is useful to ground MI within the principle of the “social 
state”.  
 
 
6. Social state principle and minimum income  
 
As Bognetti argues, “in contemporary Western societies, the 
dignity of the less fortunate citizens must be taken care of through 
robust, adequate, and free social services. If such services are not 
expressly provided for in the constitution, they must be read into its 
general clauses. The state ought to assure a minimum standard of 
living to all citizens. Decent housing ought to be provided to them 
through public funds as a distinct, officially recognized ‘social’ right, 
or otherwise human dignity would be offended.”49 
What is the origin of this obligation on the State to provide at 
least a minimum level of social rights? As Katrougalos argues, one of 
the distinctive features of the European model of social rights 
protection is that it is informed by the “social state” principle, which 
                                                                                            
49 G. BOGNETTI, The Concept of Human Dignity in European and U.S. 
Constitutionalism, in G. NOLTE (ed.), European and US Constitutionalism, Science 
and Technique of Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 
85-107. 
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is not the same as the “welfare state” concept. While the latter is a 
descriptive notion which effectively describes the form of state that 
emerged after World War II in response to the new forces of the 
capitalist economy, the former “is a normative, prescriptive principle, 
which defines a specific polity, a sub-category of the welfare state in 
the former sense, where the State has the constitutional obligation to 
assume interventionist functions in the economic and social 
spheres.”50 
In such a sense, the social state principle permeates the 
constitutional order of many European States, not only in Germany, 
where the social state principle is enshrined in article 20 GG, but in 
many other countries too, such as Greece, which introduced the 
concept in 2001 despite it already being considered a fundamental 
principle, Italy and Portugal, even without an explicit constitutional 
reference to the concept. As argued, “the term is now widely used 
throughout Europe, as a fundamental normative and organizational 
general principle of the Constitution, on par with the Rule of Law. 
Indicative of its continental acceptance is the fact that the majority of 
the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe have 
incorporated a similar clause in their Constitutions. It is, anyway, 
broadly accepted in European constitutional theory that the concept 
can be deduced from the overall corpus of constitutional legislation, 
even without explicit, solemn reference to it.”51 The principle of social 
state favoured more than simply the protection of social rights per se. 
It is a principle which “contributes to the formulation of an objective 
system of values, which constitutes a different constitutional ‘ethos’ to 
that of a liberal state.”52 In this framework, concepts such as human 
dignity and equality “acquire not only a programmatic but a fully 
normative, binding content.”53 
                                                                                            
50 G. S. Katrougalos, The (Dim) Perspectives of the European Social 
Citizenship, in Jean Monnet Working Papers 05/07, 2007, p. 10. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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This strict relationship clearly appears in the well-known legal 
reasoning of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) in its 
jurisprudence on the Existenzminimum. This path was taken in the 
famous Hartz IV54 decision, where the BVerfG created a 
constitutional right to guarantee a subsistence minimum by law based 
on article 1(1) GG in conjunction with the social state principle in 
article 20(1) GG. In Hartz IV, the right to a subsistence minimum is 
seen as an absolute right that may not be left to the discretionary 
disposal of the legislator. Indeed, the latter must give the right 
concrete form, orienting the benefits to be paid towards the respective 
stage of development of the polity and towards the existing conditions 
of life.55 More specifically, article 1.1 of the Basic Law establishes this 
right as a human right encompassing both the physical existence of a 
human being, and the possibility to have interpersonal relationships 
and some minimum degree of participation in social, cultural and 
political life.  
In other countries, such as Italy, Portugal, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Latvia and Greece, although human dignity may not have 
the same normative force to be the foundation of the duty of the state 
to provide an “existence minimum”, and social rights protection is 
often more uncertain and changing, “the Sozialstaat principle has put 
down firm roots in all of these constitutional systems, just as it has in 
Germany, France and a number of other countries, and it 
consequently limits to some degree the extent to which social 
provision can be diluted or eliminated in these States.”56 Consider the 
case of Italy. As Ciolli argues, the very structure of the Italian 
Constitution protects social rights from being reduced due to a 
scarcity of economic resources. In our contemporary democracies the 
                                                                                            
54 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 9 
February 2010, 1 BVL 1/09, 1 BVL 3/09, 1 BVL 4/09, Hartz IV.  
55 Ibid.  
56 C. O’Cinneide, Austerity and the faded dream of a ‘social Europe’ in A. 
Nolan (ed.), Economic and Social Rights after the Global Financial Crisis, 
Cambridge, 2014, p. 176. 
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relations between social rights, substantial equality and the principle 
of social dignity are so strong that the guarantee of social rights is a 
fundamental, inherent characteristic of the form of State.57  
 
 
7. Social state principle in times of austerity 
 
The economic crisis that, starting from 2008, affected Europe 
and its Member States, had a significant impact not only on the EU’s 
economic and financial policies, but also on the status of social rights 
protection and on the future developments of the so-called “social 
model”. For the first time in EU history, the threat of austerity 
entered the EU socioeconomic space, a space that until the eruption 
of the financial crisis had been relatively stable - developed under the 
rules of the Maastricht Treaty58 - and which seemed “immune” to the 
crises that occurred in other parts of the world, such as Latin America 
or South-East Asia.  
EU institutions embraced Washington-style consensus 
measures59, challenging the basic assumptions of the social democratic 
state. The adoption of austerity measures – negotiated by national 
governments and international financial institutions – resulted in 
severe and unprecedented violations of fundamental constitutional 
rights60, especially social rights, which were the most affected by the 
                                                                                            
57 I. Ciolli, I diritti sociali al tempo della crisi economica, in 
Costituzionalismo.it, n3, 2010, p. 10.  
58 E. W. Bo ̈ckenförde Kennt die europäische Not kein Gebot? in Neue 
Zu ̈richer Zeitung, 2010. As Bo ̈ckenfo ̈rde argues: “Die Krise der Europäischen 
Union hat ihren Grund in Widersprüchlichkeiten und Strukturfehlern des EU-
Vertrags seit der Einführung der Währungsunion im Vertrag von Maastricht. Sie 
war vorhersehbar und ist nicht einfach vom Himmel gefallen.” 
59 S. Lütz, M. Kranke, The European rescue of the Washington Consensus? 
EU and IMF lending to Central and Eastern European countries, in Review of 
International Political Economy, 21:2, 2014, p. 310-338. 
60 G. Katrougalos, The Greek Austerity Measures: Violations of Socio-
Economic Rights in International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog, 2013, available 
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scarcity of financial resources.61 The core of the social state principle 
has been challenged by loan conditions, most of which imposed 
reductions in public spending on health62, social assistance, education, 
pensions, and social security.63 Moreover, such loan conditions 
                                                                                           
at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/01/the-greek-austerity-measures-violations-
of-socio-economic-rights.  
61 A. Nolan (ed), Economic and Social Rights after the Global Financial 
Crisis, CUP, 2014. 
62 “The fiscal consolidation policies have limited the affordability and 
accessibility of public health-care services in programme countries. In Greece, a 
large number of individuals dropped out of the public health insurance schemes. 
Reform measures included reduction of health-care staff, reduction in the number 
of public hospital beds and an increase in co-payments for outpatient treatment or 
medication, effectively shifting the cost burden from public budgets to citizens. 
Waiting times for medical examinations and surgery increased in Cyprus, Greece, 
Ireland and Spain. In Greece, social clinics and social pharmacies staffed by 
volunteer doctors and nurses have been set up to service patients who are not able 
to get adequate treatment in public health-care facilities. Access to health care has 
been a particular concern in relation to undocumented migrants and refugees. In 
2012, Spain limited access of undocumented migrants to the public health-care 
system. In Greece, 17.3 per cent of all persons belonging to the lowest income 
quintile reported in 2014 not to have been able to undergo a necessary medical 
treatment, either because of waiting lists, cost, or because services were too far away. 
A similar, less drastic trend can be seen in Cyprus. Survey data in Ireland and Spain 
also show a significant increase in the number of individuals reporting unmet health 
care needs”, Report of the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and 
other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all 
human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights on his mission to 
institutions of the European Union, 28 December 2016, www.documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G16/442/18/PDF/G1644218.pdf?OpenElement 
(last accessed 15 January 2019). On the impact of austerity on health care see also, 
D. Stuckler, A. Reeves, R. Loopstra, M. Karanikolos, M. McKee, Austerity and 
health: the impact in the UK and Europe, in European Journal of Public Health, 
vol. 27, 2017, p. 18–21. 
63 “Measures implemented in countries affected by adjustment included 
reform of pension and social welfare systems, including unemployment benefits or 
benefits for families, children and persons with disabilities. The reform measures 
have so far not been able to reduce poverty and material deprivation, in particular 
among children, migrants, the unemployed, single-parent households and female 
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severely undermined labour rights64, reforming the system of 
collective bargaining and transforming labour relations. Greece, 
Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus, and - outside the Eurozone - Latvia, 
Hungary and Romania were the most affected by such severe terms.  
Legal scholars such as Salomon65 and Fischer-Lescano66 have 
already highlighted the broad violations of human rights by the 
austerity measures enacted by the Troika. Such impacts were also 
assessed by the “UN Independent expert on the effects of foreign 
debt and other related international financial obligations of States on 
the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social 
and cultural rights” during his mission to Greece. In his report he 
highlighted the serious and devastating effects of adjustment measures 
on human rights. In his conclusions, he specifically highlighted that 
“Social and economic rights have been denied in a widespread 
manner. More than one million persons in Greece have fallen below 
income levels indicating extreme poverty.… These individuals are 
ultimately denied, in one or another form, the enjoyment of core 
                                                                                           
pensioners. (…) In Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain there were 3.8 
million more persons at risk of poverty and social exclusion in 2014 than in 2008”, 
Report of the Independent Expert, par. 58. 
64 “Fiscal consolidation policies often included reducing the number of 
public employees. Restrictions on hiring in the public sector were introduced in 
Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In Greece, measures also included a 
labour reserve scheme aimed at transferring or dismissing workers employed in the 
public sector. Conditions for collective dismissals were relaxed in Greece and Spain. 
Public sector wages were cut in Cyprus, Greece, Ireland and Portugal and minimum 
wages frozen in Portugal and cut in Greece, including to levels below the statutory 
minimum wage for young workers entering the labour market”, Report of the 
Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international 
financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly 
economic, social and cultural rights on his mission to institutions of the European 
Union, 28 December 2016, par. 51. 
65 M. Salomon, Of Austerity, Human Rights and International Institutions, in 
European Law Journal, vol. 21, 2015, p. 521-545. 
66 A. Fisher-Lescano, Human Rights in Times of Austerity Policy, Nomos, 
2014. 
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essential minimum levels of social, economic and cultural rights, 
which States have to protect in all circumstances. Extreme poverty in 
Greece is pervasive, taking into consideration the fact that currently, 1 
of 10 persons (or 10.4 per cent of the population) is living under such 
conditions.”67  
In such a scenario, characterized by a massive drop in the 
standard of social rights enjoyed by European citizens and by the 
inadequacy of the existing social security schemes, one may rightly 
ask: what tools that can be deployed to guarantee a dignified existence 
when the “Sozialstaat” is experiencing a crisis? 
 
 
8. Minimum income in Europe: lights and shadows 
 
Minimum income can be defined as a regular (i.e. monthly) 
money from general taxation assigned to those who live below a given 
poverty line. It is a tool specifically targeted to reduce poverty and to 
help subjects who cannot work or find a job.  
The European Pillar of Social Rights has defined MI as follows: 
“Adequate MI benefits shall be ensured for those who lack sufficient 
resources for a decent standard of living. For those of working age, 
these benefits shall include requirements for participation in active 
support to encourage labor market (re)integration.”68 Today, most EU 
Member States have adopted some form of minimum income. 
However, minimum income is not a standard, fixed tool and an 
examination of the different MI schemes adopted by EU Member 
States shows a wide spectrum of different solutions. The opposites of 
this spectrum are: 1) systems where minimum income is the only (or 
                                                                                            
67 Report of the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other 
related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all 
human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights on his mission to 
Greece, A/HRC/31/60/Add.2 par. 76 
68 C. Crepaldi et al, Minimum Income Policies in EU Member States, Study 
for the EMPL Committee, 2017. 
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the most important) income support scheme and it addresses all those 
who are without sufficient resources, thus it is not limited to specific 
targets of the population; 2) systems where minimum income is 
considered as a last resort tool for those who have already exhausted 
all other possible applications for targeted measures. In this case, 
minimum income can be guaranteed to certain target groups – 
disabled, elderly, unemployed – and usually under certain conditions. 
On such a spectrum, the actual adoption of MI by countries varies 
substantially, with even the amounts being made available significantly 
different. There are many reasons for such differences between 
countries.  
The first element to take into account is how the “social state” 
principle is adopted across Europe (Social Democratic/Nordic Model, 
liberal model, conservative model and Southern Europe model.)69 
Following along a similar track, any comparative analysis of the 
different schemes should also take into account “the normative 
foundations behind them and the notion of solidarity they pursue, as 
addressing in a non-neutral way key concerns about who are the poor, 
who deserve to be assisted, in what forms and by whom.”70 
Focusing specifically on MI, much of this variation is because 
the poverty threshold is determined nationally, by law or other 
administrative sources of law. Sometimes there is a mechanism used to 
establish the level of payments based on specific indicators (i.e. a 
percentage of the social pension or of the minimum wage); however, 
in most of cases there is no such mechanism and the determination of 
the minimum level is set discretionally by the public administration. 
Moreover, in several countries (Germany, Finland and Sweden), MI 
can be increased to cover specific needs, such as rent, heating, 
electricity, health care, school expenses for children, and 
                                                                                            
69 M. Ferrera, Modelli di solidarieta ̀, Bologna, 1993; G. Esping-Andersen, 
The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, New York, 1990.   
70 N. Riva, I. Madama, Giulia Bistagnino, The politics of redistribution an 
interdisciplinary dialogue on the foundations of the welfare state, Centro Einaudi, 
Working Paper n. 4/2015, p. 29. 
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transportation costs from and to the workplace.71 The degree of 
public expenditure allocated to MI schemes is another key factor 
when exploring how MI differs between countries.  
The interplay between the regulation and the organization of the 
schemes plays a fundamental role in explaining the differences in MI 
schemes.72 In many countries, regulatory functions are centralized, 
whereas managing functions are devolved to local governments, such 
that “the mainstream trend to reduce discretionary allocation of 
benefits is to centralize eligibility rules and to decentralize the 
managing of conditionality, which often needs to be addressed 
considering case-by-case situations.73” However, the decentralization 
of the implementation of the benefits, especially when the local 
government enjoys a key role in the social security system, poses some 
challenges in terms of the possible emergence of territorial 
inequalities.74  
Last but not least, a key feature of minimum income, which 
makes it clearly different from basic income75, is the use of a regime of 
conditionality to access to the benefit. Such conditions are usually 
related to trying to find a job in a given time, or to attending 
vocational training courses. The UK Universal Credit System, where 
conditionality plays a central and critical role, requires that claimants 
sign a claimant commitment with strict guidelines. Conditionality 
related to labour market policies is clearly also found in Italy, the 
Netherlands and Portugal. Conditionality, as it has been observed, “is 
                                                                                            
71 N. Petzold, National report: Germany, Combating Poverty in Europe: Re-
organising Active Inclusion through Participatory and Integrated Participatory and 
Integrated Modes of Multilevel Governance, 2013. 
72 C. Crepaldi et al, Minimum Income Policies in EU Member States, Study 
for the EMPL Committee, 2017. 
73 Idem. 
74 See L. Natili, The unexpected institutionalization of minimum income in 
Spain, Centro Einaudi, Working Paper n. 2/2016. 
75 Basic income is a universal money subsidy which is granted to all, 
regardless of their income or working conditions.  
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probably the main theme and affects many countries belonging to all 
the different welfare systems.”76  
Looking at the pervasive role of conditionality in designing MI 
schemes, it is clear the aim of MI is not (anymore) to only be a tool to 
guarantee a minimum level of dignified existence, but also to foster 
the realization of social inclusion and the integration of unemployed 
people into the labour market. To this regard, it has been argued that 
MI schemes have witnessed a transformation over time: “From mainly 
residual instruments that aimed to guarantee minimum income 
support and to prevent extreme marginality, in most countries they 
now have an ‘ambiguous’ function – promoted by the active inclusion 
paradigm introduced by the European Union.”77 As it has been 
noticed, “within this active inclusion approach, “policies aim not only 
to provide resources but also to reduce individuals’ need for help, in 
particular by supporting their access to the labor market.”78. 
This is the context in which to interpret the increasing presence 
of conditions that link the benefits to a set of often quite strict 
conditions: registering with public employment services; seeking a job; 
accepting job offers; participation in activation measures such as 
training, personal development or community service; having used all 
possible entitlements to other social security benefits; selling or 
making use of one’s own assets (e.g. selling or renting a property); and 
keeping the benefits administration informed of any changes in 
personal circumstances. Failure to comply with such conditions can 
lead to severe sanctions, with access to the benefit denied or 
temporarily suspended.  
                                                                                            
76 C. Crepaldi et al, Minimum Income Policies in EU Member States, Study 
for the EMPL Committee, 2017, p. 54. 
77 M. Natili, Worlds of last-resort safety nets? A proposed typology of 
minimum income schemes in Europe, in Journal of International and Comparative 
Social Policy, Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy, 2019. 
78 M. Heidenreich, N. Petzold, M. Natili & A. Panican Active inclusion as an 
organisational challenge: integrated anti-poverty policies in three European 
countries, in Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy, vol. 30:2, 2014, 
p. 180-198. 
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This turn towards significant conditionality, an approach that 
has become particularly evident with the economic crisis, poses 
several challenges to the nature and ultimate aim of MI schemes: “the 
active inclusion approach too often has meant the introduction of 
measures narrowly focused on employment and on increasing 
conditionality and sanctions. Several countries have introduced the 
obligation to take up public work as a counterpart for receiving MI, 
even when there are clear indications that these workfare measures do 
not increase people’s chances to return to the labor market.”79 
While entering the labour market is definitely an important step 
to get out of poverty, the strict imposition of conditionality fosters the 
phenomenon of the so-called “working poor” as “strict conditionality 
and a high degree of re-commodification, increase the risk of in-work 
poverty.”80 
In most of the systems where the MI scheme is minimal and 
subject to strict conditionality, this effect is even more evident and it is 
one of the main reasons why MI is so ineffective in fighting poverty. 
Such a statement should not be construed as saying all MI schemes 
are ineffective or that activation policies have no positive effects on 
reducing poverty and social exclusion. According to recent literature, 
“only the combination of well financed active labor market policies 
and generous social benefits is the most promising strategy to fight in-
work poverty.”81 
This brief analysis of MI schemes in Europe shows the 
complexity and the multiple criticisms of this social policy measure 
designed to fight poverty and social exclusion. MI is certainly one of 
the most promising instruments to reduce poverty across Europe. 
However, several critical aspects can reduce and compromise its 
                                                                                            
79 C. Crepaldi et al, Minimum Income Policies in EU Member States, Study 
for the EMPL Committee, 2017, p. 45. 
80 S. Seikel, Activation Into In-Work Poverty?, in Social Europe, September 
2017. 
81 Ibid. 
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concrete effectiveness. The great differences between countries, the 
different poverty lines adopted, the variations in terms of public 
expenditure in MI schemes, the different types of programmes 
associated with MI schemes (only labour market related or extended 
to health, education, housing), must be taken into account when 
comparing and assessing effectiveness. Moreover, MI schemes cannot 
be properly studied without a thorough understanding of the general 
model of welfare state adopted and the normative premises of each 
model. 
 
 
 
 
9. Conclusions  
 
The relation among human dignity, equality and the fight 
against poverty remains one of the most challenging issues faced by 
our contemporary constitutional systems. It is a conundrum for legal 
scholars and policymakers. This is especially true in times of crisis: 
both the financial and the constitutional crisis are questioning and 
revealing the limits of traditional models of the welfare state. Social 
democratic systems seem unable to enact effective policies to fight 
poverty, foster social inclusion and counteract economic inequalities 
in ever more polarized societies.  
To tackle these issues the EU has encouraged Member States to 
adopt economic/legal measures. MI schemes are clearly one of the 
favoured tools for this, but there is no “one size fits for all” for these 
instruments since their concrete design and implementation strongly 
depends on the relevant historical, social and legal context. 
Additionally, assessing their actual effectiveness must be done taking 
into account the specific features of the specific constitutional order.  
Given the complexity of this backdrop, our goal is not to offer a 
way out of poverty but to propose two lens through which to look at 
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these issues from the specific constitutional comparative law 
perspective.  
The first ‘lens’ is a methodological one. Equality, poverty, 
minimum subsistence and basic good are traditionally the focus of 
economic inquiry and theories of social justice. Economics uses a 
twofold approach to study these concepts: a concrete lexicon based 
on a set of collected data to help in determining out how to build 
economic policies; and an ‘abstract’ approach, made of several 
different economic theories and interpretations of what equality, 
poverty and basic good are.  
This variety of interpretations is the same that we can find in the 
different realizations of the social state principle in the constitutional 
realm. This is the why comparative constitutional law and economic 
perspective must be strictly intertwined in facing these challenges. 
Indeed, the comparative law perspective helps to contextualize the 
economic data within the specific constitutional context according to 
the historical evolution of the form of State.82 Similarly, comparative 
constitutional law enables us to look at the issue of equality and 
poverty in the light of the relation between liberty and authority, 
which grounds the idea of social justice of the different constitutional 
systems.  
The second ‘lens’ is a substantive one: minimum income can be 
considered a social parachute, a safety net aimed to alleviate the 
negative externalities of the market. But, in a perspective of equality, it 
is not enough. States cannot limit their intervention downstream as 
they ought to provide solutions upstream, in the light of a concept of 
social justice based on freedom and responsibility and on the capacity 
of every single person to act in social groups, helping each other to 
achieve human dignity. As Carozza argues “subsidiarity takes the 
freedom necessary for human dignity and extends it to a regard for 
freedom at all levels of social organization. This freedom, however, is 
                                                                                            
82 G. Bognetti, La Divisione dei poteri, Giappichelli, Milano, 2001. 
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not simply a negative notion of restraint from interference.”83 If 
“freedom is understood as the ability to reach one’s complete 
flourishing, to realize the capacities of a being of inherent dignity, it 
can also be served by an intervention that creates the necessary 
conditions for the individual to lead a life of purpose and 
fulfilment.”84 The duty of the state is to monitor and potentially 
intervene, in a lens of subsidiarity, such that someone who needs help 
today, can be an active citizen of social solidarity. This is the challenge 
and the task the EU is called to face in the future of the EU social 
space.  
 
 
Abstract : The relation among human dignity, equality and the 
fight against poverty remains one of the most challenging issues faced 
by our contemporary constitutional systems. It is a conundrum for 
legal scholars and policymakers. This is especially true in times of 
crisis: both the financial and the constitutional crisis are questioning 
and revealing the limits of traditional models of the welfare state. 
Social democratic systems seem unable to enact effective policies to 
fight poverty, foster social inclusion and counteract economic 
inequalities in ever more polarized societies.  The aim of this paper is 
to offer food for thought on the sensitive relationship among human 
dignity, economic inequality and poverty from a constitutional 
perspective. The paper is divided in two parts: the first one addresses 
the issue starting from a theoretical perspective in order to provide a 
more concrete understanding of the equality/inequality, human 
dignity and poverty triad, and the consequent implications. The 
second part adopts a more analytical perspective, focusing on one of 
the tools designed by legal systems to fight poverty and restore 
equality and human dignity: the Minimum Income (MI).  
 
                                                                                            
83 P.G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human 
Rights Law, in The American Journal of International Law, 2003 p. 44. 
84 Idem. 
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